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This report examines Porphyry’s De antro nympharum and its eclectic mixture of 
philosophy, allegory, and mysticism in the form of a Homeric commentary. The paper 
situates Porphyry’s commentary in the broader tradition of Homeric interpretation with 
special attention to Stoic exegesis and Platonic views on poetry and myth. It also 
contextualizes Porphyry’s philosophy in terms of the mystery cults, particularly 
Mithraism, that had grown very popular by Porphyry’s time. The paper argues that 
Porphyry devised a practice of reading intended to promote a level of philosophical 
contemplation beyond the level of rational discourse, in keeping with the Neoplatonic 
philosophy of his teacher, Plotinus, and that this practice is especially evident in the De 
antro nympharum. 
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 From an extremely early point, Hellenic identity arranged itself around a set of 
key components. One of these important markers of Hellenism was the Greek language 
itself, a language of great antiquity and of a major, early literary tradition. This tradition 
was based especially around the Homeric epics and also around the somewhat later 
Homeric hymns. These poems performed many functions. The epics, alongside their 
more readily-apparent narrative and socio-cultural value, also provided important insights 
about the nature of the gods and the universe. The hymns, chiefly imprecations to the 
gods, often included major narrative components such as the hymn to Demeter. In each of 
these poetic modes there is an ever-present relationship between the verse and the gods. 
This relationship is not the same between the epics and the hymns–for instance, the 
Homeric speaker primarily speaks of Achilles’ rage and of Odysseus’ travails to the 
extent that the muse inspires him, whereas the hymns are in honor of a specific god and 
contain hope for favorable intervention on the part of that god. While the particulars 
differ between these two modes, poetry and prayer, the way they each allow an individual 
to evoke–in the case of epic–and invoke–in the case of hymn–the divine is central to the 
role that poetry would assume in later antiquity, from the Classical age onward. This 
relationship finds major expression in Porphyry’s Homeric commentaries, which were at 
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once deeply steeped in the long tradition of Homeric interpretation and also a vehicle for 
Porphyry’s Neoplatonic philosophy. 
 Homeric epic became for the ancients a source of all kinds of wisdom. Some 
sought historical fact in the Iliad and Odyssey; others sought self-aware philosophizing; 
still others looked for the hidden wisdom of lost sages encoded in the exploits of the 
Homeric heroes and the quarrels of their gods. Yet as Plato noted, seeking rational 
cosmic truths in the epics was at first glance a fool’s errand. The gods of Homer behaved 
irrationally, unjustly, and less-than-divinely. Homer’s inconsistency was a fundamental 
conflict for those who wished to treat the poems as philosophical texts. This conflict gave 
rise to inventive solutions: for instance, Stoic readers appealed to etymological arguments 
to discover key principles of Stoic physics and cosmology in the Homeric poems. If Hera 
was a fictional accretion surrounding a core truth about the nature of ἀήρ and its 
interaction with the other parts of the cosmos, her intractability toward Zeus in the Iliad 
can become symbolic of cosmic forces, rather than just petty. 
 These metaphorical or figurative etymological readings were essential to 
developing a mode of Homeric interpretation that reconciled perceived inaccuracies or 
falsehoods in the epics. The genre of philosophical Homeric interpretation became more 
popular over time, alongside a related but distinct genre of literary criticism as practiced 
by the scholiasts. As the genre developed, Homeric interpreters focused on key passages 
that had posed issues for many previous commentators in the hopes that their new reading 
would provide a solution for the passage (often enough in service of adding prestige and 
antiquity to their own philosophical school) and become the canonical reading. These 
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ancient commentators expanded on the paradigms of etymological interpretation, 
rhetorically-minded literary criticism, and exegesis on metaphors to develop an 
allegorical mode of reading. Allegorical reading connected one metaphorical 
interpretation to the next in a constant stream that took on its own narrative qualities, and 
it became a very popular tool for answering so-called “Homeric Questions” among the 
ancients. Quaestiones Homeriae were works devoted to locating problematic passages in 
Homer, passages in which the gods acted inconsistently and posed a challenge to a 
rational conception of the world and of the gods. These passages required explanation or 
rationalization to bring them into coherence with a given writer’s philosophical 
worldview. 
 By the time Porphyry was writing, Homeric interpretation was a very well-
established genre of easily-recognized conventions. Yet Porphyry stood at a crossroad of 
traditions, where the precepts of his teacher Plotinus were guiding philosophy in a new 
direction. The Platonic tradition after Plotinus became a ferment of Neoplatonism, Neo-
Pythagoreanism, Stoicism, theurgy, and magic. This blend found a unique expression in 
every major thinker of the period of transition from high empire to late antiquity, and 
even those like Porphyry who rejected the ritual and cultic components of theurgy 
exhibited a fascination with these same practices. Plotinus himself was opposed to the 
theurgic schools and especially to Gnosticism, but his Neoplatonism involved basic 
structures that resembled those of theurgy and mystery cult. Through a hierarchical series 
of studies and contemplations, an individual could eventually achieve assimilation to the 
divine One, which was ineffable and immanent, and which interacted with mortals 
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through a process of immaterial emanation. This process consisted of divine descent 
simultaneous with mortal ascent resulting in an intermingling of human and divine 
entities. 
 At this moment of a significant shift in traditions of thought, Porphyry wrote his 
own Homeric Questions, which more or less follow the template for the genre with the 
addition of his own Neoplatonism, and the result was a new use of poetry as a tool of 
contemplation. In his essay On the Cave of the Nymphs in Homer’s Odyssey, or De antro 
nympharum, Porphyry approaches a passage from Book 13 in the Odyssey that had long 
history of puzzling the Homeric commentators1: 
αὐτὰρ ἐπὶ κρατὸς λιµένος τανύφυλλος ἐλαίη, 
ἀγχόθι δ’ αὐτῆς ἄντρον ἐπήρατον ἠεροειδές,  
ἱρὸν νυµφάων αἳ νηιάδες καλέονται. (5) 
ἐν τῷ κρητῆρές τε καὶ ἀµφιφορῆες ἔασι 
λάινοι· ἔνθα δ’ ἔπειτα τιθαιβώσσουσι µέλισσαι. 
ἐν δ’ ἱστοὶ λίθεοι περιµήκεες, ἔνθα τε νύµφαι 
φάρε’ ὑφαίνουσιν ἁλιπόρφυρα, θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι· 
ἐν δ’ ὕδατ’ ἀενάοντα. δύω δέ τέ οἱ θύραι εἰσίν, (10) 
αἱ µὲν πρὸς βορέαο καταβαταὶ ἀνθρώποισιν,  
αἱ δ’ αὖ πρὸς νότου εἰσὶ θεώτεραι· οὐδέ τι κείνῃ  
ἄνδρες ἐσέρχονται, ἀλλ’ ἀθανάτων ὁδός ἐστιν. 
 
At the harbor’s head a branching olive stands 
with a welcome cave nearby it, dank with sea-mist, 
sacred to nymphs of the spring we call the Naiads. 
There are mixing-bowls inside and double-handled jars, 
crafted of stone, and bees store up their honey in the hollows. 
There are stone looms as well, where the nymphs weave out 
their webs from clouds of sea-blue wool–a marvelous sight– 
and a wellspring flows forever. The cave has two ways in, 
one facing the North Wind, a pathway down for mortals; 
                                                
1 Porphyry himself cites his forebears Cronius and Numenius, as well as Artemidorus the Geographer, as 
commentators who either interpreted this passage allegorically or attempted to locate the cave. 
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the other, facing the South, belongs to the gods, 
no man may go that way... 
it is the path for all the deathless powers.2 
 
This passage was ripe with meaning for the Neoplatonist Porphyry, from its watery 
nymphs to its twin gates, and in it Porphyry found deep wisdom regarding the generation 
of souls into bodies and the mingling of the human and divine. His interpretation of this 
passage is an eclectic blend of Neoplatonic philosophy, Mithraic symbolism, and 
cosmology. This paper will examine the ways that Porphyry models a philosophical 
mode of reading with the De antro nympharum. First, the paper will define the ancient 
modes of allegorical reading that led to Porphyry’s mode of reading, drawing on both 
ancient rhetorical guides and modern literary theory. Next, the paper will trace a history 
of Homeric commentary, allegory, and denunciation with special attention to the authors 
and perspectives most essential to Porphyry’s tradition, such as Plato’s attack on poets. 
The paper will then explore the relationship of Porphyry’s philosophical method to the 
mystery cults popular in the high imperial and late antique periods, both more broadly 
and with regard to his contrast with Iamblichus, Plotinus’ student who set up a theurgic 
school in Syria. This section will also examine in depth the relationship between poetic-
imprecatory language, its human practitioners, and the divine. Overall, this study argues 
that the De antro nympharum establishes Porphyry as a philosophical guide analogous to 
the mystagogue who leads the neophyte through the appropriate stages toward divine 
revelation, which in the context of Porphyry’s Neoplatonism meant an assimilation with 
                                                
2 Robert Fagles, (New York: Penguin, 1996) 289-90. 
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the divine. The De antro nympharum itself offers a specific place for this ascent to occur, 
in the cave that Homer describes and that his verses evoke in the mind of the reader. 
 
Vita et Opera Porphyrii 
 
 A brief overview of Porphyry’s life and studies presents a useful trajectory for 
understanding his concerns and his approaches in De antro nympharum. Although he was 
profiled by later authors, the best source for Porphyry’s own life is his Vita Plotini, which 
he included as the preface to his edition of the Enneads. He was probably born in 234 
C.E., studied at Athens with the Platonist Longinus, and then spent six years studying 
with Plotinus.3 Porphyry credits Plotinus with helping him out of depression by advising, 
either in person or through another student, that he should spend some time in Sicily to 
recover. The two would not meet again, as Plotinus died while Porphyry was in Sicily. 
The unreliable secondhand account of Eunapius claims that Porphyry taught in Rome, but 
other than a probable trip to his hometown of Tyre in the late 260s or early 270s attested 
in a letter to his old teacher, Longinus, little is known of his life after Sicily. Porphyry’s 
death date is unknown, but at Vita Plotini 23.13 he gives his age at the time of editing the 
Enneads as sixty-eight, which dates that edition to around 302 C.E. with his birth in 234. 
                                                
3 Andrew Smith, “Porphyrian Studies Since 1913,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen 
Welt II 36.2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1987) 719-722 provides a biography of Porphyry drawing 
together numerous ancient sources. Porphyry, Vit. Plot. 5,1-6 indicates around six years of study 
with Plotinus. The following biography is summarized from the Vit. Plot. and from A. Smith’s 
reconstruction of Porphyry’s life. 
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 Porphyry’s works spanned Neoplatonic themes in the tradition of Plotinus and 
older Pythagorean themes, and sometimes he indulged a mystical vein that Plotinus likely 
disapproved of. Among other works, he wrote a Vita Pythagorae and a De abstinentia on 
vegetarianism, a probably early De philosophia ex oraculis, commentaries on Plato’s 
Timaeus and Parmenides and on Aristotle’s Categories, a treatise Contra Christianos and 
one against Iamblichus, and a number of Homeric commentaries which survive variously, 
including the De antro nympharum which is the subject of the current study. Andrew 
Smith in his overview of Porphyrian studies of the twentieth century observes that a good 
deal of Porphyry scholarship focused on resolving a chronology of his changing 
viewpoints.4 In general, Porphyry seems to have been more uncritically interested in 
religious phenomena earlier in his life, but his study with Plotinus tempered or quelled 
this interest. Under Longinus, before working with Plotinus, Porphyry developed his 
literary skills, his philology and exegesis. Later in his life, he returned to a certain extent 
to his more mystical interests. This modern conception of Porphyry as rather fickle in his 
ideas comes primarily from Iamblichus, Proclus, Eunapius, and Augustine, however, and 
of these authors, the only one who was Porphyry’s contemporary, Iamblichus, was 
explicitly hostile towards his views. Iamblicus’s animosity was probably the basis for 
Proclus’s poor opinion of Porphyry, since both Iamblichus and Proclus criticized 
Porphyry as insufficiently mystical.5 
                                                
4 Smith 1987, 722-729 outlines these viewpoints by theme. 
5 Joseph Bidez, Vie de Porphyre, le philosophe néo-platonicien: avec les fragments des traités 
Peri agalmatōn et De regressu (Hildesheim: G. Olm, 1964). A. Smith 1987, 722-723. 
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 The ancient characterization of Porphyry as fickle plays into another modern 
characterization, that of his unoriginality. A lack of originality may arise as much from 
his dutiful and lengthy citations–a practice not all ancients shared–and from the spotty 
survival of his texts as from a real lack of personal insight. As noted above, a significant 
portion of his remaining works are commentaries on major philosophical texts and on 
Homer, which is not unusual. Commentaries on existing texts became more and more 
prevalent in later antiquity. This paper focuses on one prime example of Porphyry’s 
Homeric exegesis, the De antro nympharum, which employs the philological methods 
evident in his Quaestiones Homericae but, as this paper argues, with a specific 
philosophical goal. Porphyry’s manner of reading Homer in De antro nympharum was 
not simply philological, but allegorical, discovering cosmic truths in Homer’s text, and 
constructed a mystic-esoteric use of the Homeric text and its exegesis as contemplative 
aids. 
 
Allegory and Metaphor for the Ancients 
 
 Allegory and metaphor, now and in antiquity, are intimately related tools of 
interpretation. Cicero in the Orator related the two, saying, “Iam cum fluxerunt continuo 
plures translationes, alia plane fit oratio; itaque genus hoc Graeci appellant allegorian: 
nomine recte, genere melius ille qui ista omnia translationes vocat.”6 Allegory was 
composed of many metaphors flowing from one to the next so that the cumulative effect 
                                                
6 Cicero, Orator 94. 
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was of a whole narrative beyond or below the literal narrative. The effects of these tools 
could vary widely based on the intention of author and reader; metaphor finds its first 
definition in the context of discourses on rhetoric which tend to treat it as a decoration for 
speech, ornatus or κόσµος.7 Aristotle at Poetics 1457b7 is the first to identify µεταφορά 
in terms familiar to a modern reader, and he calls it “the introduction of an alien term” 
that nevertheless seems to fit in its new place. Along similar lines, the Greek verb 
ἀλλαγορεύειν translates literally as “to speak of other things”, and it became the standard 
term for seeking a continuous series of meanings beyond the literal narrative, as in 
Cicero’s definition.8 Simile was another closely related device, and Homeric scholiasts 
often took a minutely detailed textual approach to Homeric similes.9 These types of 
criticism were not unlike the modes of close reading familiar to modern scholars with 
their focus on the more sensory effects, rather than the more symbolic effects, of poetic 
language. Allegory with its emphasis on underlying meanings was the technique most 
intriguing to the philosophers, although in many cases they read just as closely as the 
scholiasts. 
                                                
7 Doreen Innes, “Metaphor, Simile, and Allegory,” in Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical 
Tradition, ed. G. R. Boys-Stones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 7-27. Innes identifies 
three key categories of figurative speech: metaphor as stylistic ornamentation, continuous 
metaphor, and extended allegorical interpretation, which is generally the realm of philosophers 
rather than rhetoricians and which concerns itself with what Plato called ὑπόνοια, “underlying 
thought” at Republic 378d. Isocrates 9.9 refers to metaphors along with neologisms and strange 
words as κόσµοι in the noun form. Aristotle does likewise at Rhetoric 1408a14, referring to 
εὐτελεῖ ὀνόµατι ἐπῇ κόσµος, “embellishment attached to an ordinary word” (trans. Freese, 1947) 
in his discussion of style in oratory. 
8 Dawson 1992, Lamberton, Homer the Theologian 1989. 
9 Innes 2003, 7-10. 
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 Allegorical reading allowed the ancients to achieve one of several basic goals. 
The first is to challenge the literal sense of a text with an alternate meaning–for example, 
Augustine of Hippo’s reading of the Genesis story as a metaphorical account to account 
for scientific advances in the understanding of the cosmos. The second either endorses or 
revises culture by imposing a new meaning on a text, for example in later Christian 
readings of the Old Testament flood story as representing baptism, and the Old Testament 
in general as a prefiguration of the New Testament.10 The third “textualizes” cultural 
meanings and endows them with a certain authority by rooting them in a literary canon, 
and this third form of allegory is the most common in the Stoic and Neoplatonic tradition 
of viewing Homer as an early philosopher. Taken together, these readings can be 
characterized as apologetic, appropriative, or subversive.11 These ways of reading tend to 
arise in moments of cultural shift; world views change faster than the literary canon 
possibly could. Texts like the Homeric epics, although they were subject to a certain 
degree of editing, were central to a respectable, genteel person’s education, regardless of 
the charges leveled against Homer by various philosophers.12 As philosophical thinking 
grew more sophisticated–in some cases, as Plato’s, sophisticated enough to denounce 
                                                
10 Paula Fredriksen, “Allegory and Reading God’s Book: Paul and Augustine on the Destiny of 
Israel,” in Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period, ed. Jon Whitman (Leiden: 
Brill, 2000) 136-149. Multiple levels of allegory, both challenging the original meaning of the 
text and imposing new meanings on the text to pass a judgment on culture, are evident in 
Augustine’s writings. 
11 Dawson 1992, 36-7. Morgan 2000, 63 n40 offers a succinct summary of these categories which 
builds on Dawson’s argument in the context of the Presocratic philosophers and the development 
of allegorical reading, which she views as originally apologetic because of the conflict between 
early philosophers’ emphasis on ethical consistency and mythology’s decided lack of apparent 
ethical consistencey. 
12 Philosophical opposition to Homer will be discussed in a later section. Too (2010) discusses the 
importance of the “authentic” Homeric to a Greek civic identity. 
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Homer’s world as false and unjust–some thinkers found it easier to resolve apparent 
inconsistencies in Homer by non-literal interpretations. This process could appear to a 
more critical reader as a form of rationalization, or to an optimistic reader as a form of 
cultural negotiation.13 
 These non-literal interpretations fall on a spectrum in terms of how purely 
allegorical they are. Dawson in his 1992 study has offered a limited definition of allegory 
to refer to non-literal narratives that interpreters construct on top of literal narratives. This 
definition draws a distinction between allegorical reading as the construction of a 
narrative and other non-literal forms of interpretation, such as Stoic etymological reading 
or the discovery of individual symbols within a text.14 For the most part, this definition is 
useful; given the quantity and variety of interpretative literature that survives, some 
criteria must be applied to restrict a given study. Dawson’s criteria are for the most part 
well-rooted in the traditions and techniques of ancient reading, some of which employed 
more narrative interpretations than others. Yet there exists some tension to be explored in 
this definition; the degree to which any given interpretation is narrative is somewhat 
slippery to measure, and given the self-awareness that the ancients employed in their 
rhetorical and philosophical criticism, it is perhaps prudent to fall back on the terms they 
themselves offered. 
 Cicero, quoted above from the Orator, describes allegory as a large number of 
metaphors that flow continuously. This definition offers elements of a narrative in its 
                                                
13 Whitman (ed.) 2000 offers the neutral-optimistic definition of allegory, whereas Morgan (2000) 
offers the definition of allegory as apologetic rationalization. 
14 Dawson 1992. Innes 2003. Whitman 2000. 
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sequentiality. In Poetics, Aristotle describes a plot or narrative as a series of events that 
necessarily occur as consequences of each other and which come to an end at the event 
with no necessary consequences.15 Of course, Aristotle provides this definition 
specifically regarding tragedy and, to a somewhat lesser extent, comedy and epic, rather 
than in the context of textual interpretation. Here his views on metaphor become 
especially relevant, however. A metaphor is an alien term that nonetheless finds a certain 
belonging in its new situation. The way that these metaphors flow together, to maintain 
Cicero’s image, almost requires a degree of discomfort for the reader, because the 
individual metaphor is composed of the juxtaposition of familiar and unfamiliar terms. 
The allegorical narrative stretches the sense of the literal narrative it rests on. Allegorical 
interpretations of Homer, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, often 
seem less than narrative in their stitching together of physics and metaphysics, 
cosmology and theology. Yet even as these interpretations veer into abstract and esoteric 
territory, they remain committed–as in Porphyry’s De antro nympharum–to handling the 
elements of Homer’s poem in sequence and treating them as the surface of deeper 
meanings. Although the interpretations offered by Porphyry and other philosophers on 
Homer sometimes seem less than narrative in a strict sense, they qualify as allegories for 
their sequential, continuous character and for their consistent emphasis on the text as 
containing hidden meanings beyond its literal meaning. 
 
History of Homeric Allegory 
                                                
15 Aristotle, Poetics 1450a15-39 discusses the role and value of plot in tragedy. 
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 From an early date, readers of Homer focused on the truth or falsity of the poems. 
Theagenes of Rhegium was grappling with the place of Homer in an educated reader’s 
mind in the sixth century BCE, although his texts are lost. Like the later allegorists, 
Theagenes seems to have imbued the Homeric epics with the tenets of his own 
philosophy. Many later thinkers in antiquity ascribed to Theagenes the innovation of 
associating of particular elements and abstractions with particular deities, such as Apollo 
and Hephaestus with fire or wisdom with Athena.16 The goal of this interpretation is 
unclear, but perhaps Theagenes had in mind a defense of Homer, since Homeric 
detraction and denunciation was itself an early genre.17 
 Among the first of these detractors was Xenophanes, the sixth century 
philosopher whose travels took him, apparently, to Magna Graecia and therefore possibly 
into contact with Theagenes.18 Xenophanes’ criticism of Homer was a part of his larger 
critique of Greek religion as arbitrary and misguided. Xenophanes considered the 
Homeric and Hesiodic gods culpable for theft, adultery, and deception. Moreover, 
                                                
16 Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: Druckerei Hildebrand, 1961) 51-52, A1-4 collects 
the late scholiasts’ references toTheagenes’s career as one who wrote on Homer. Donald A. 
Russell and David Konstan, Heraclitus: Homeric Problems (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2005) 6-30. Jean Pierre Vernant, Mythe et Société en Grèce ancienne (Atlantic 
Highlands: Humanities Press, 1980) 212. Vernant places Theagenes of Rhegium at the beginning 
of the allegorical tradition as potentially the originator of a mode of reading that relocates 
cosmology, physics, metaphysics, and morality into the Homeric epics. Kathleen Freeman The 
Pre-Socratic Philosphers: A Companion to Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1966) 41 offers a summary of the ancient attitude to Theagenes. 
17 Morgan 2000 argues that before the Stoics there is no strong sense of authors legitimizing their 
own views by sourcing them in Homer, but this became relatively standard practice in later 
authors. 
18 Xenophanes alludes to his own travels in 21 B 8 D. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Phil. IX.18ff 
describes Xenophanes’ travels to Sicily and Elea. 
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anthropomorphic gods were no more than reflections of human narcissism, as Ethiopians 
had dark-skinned gods, Thracians had fair-complexioned gods, and for that matter, horses 
probably had horse-shaped gods.19 Regardless of whether Xenophanes and Theagenes 
had any direct contact, these two modes of reading had significant interplay in later ages. 
The readiness with which the ancients identified sixth-century Theagenes as the 
originator of allegorical or metaphorical reading of poetry speaks to the antiquity of the 
genre, even if he was not its true inventor. 
 As metaphorical reading and allegory became solid techniques in the textual 
critic’s repertoire, particular styles of reading emerged–even exegesis as a competition of 
gentility, as in Plato’s Protagoras, which offered a Platonic response to the Sophistic 
mode of reading.20 Each philosophical school had its own particular mode of reading 
Homer, which often played into a means of legitimizing or authorizing its own 
viewpoints. For example, Stoic interpretation relied on etymological arguments to 
recover the original meanings of poetic texts that had grown obscure over time as later 
poets added “invented” elements of language and plot. Lucius Annaeus Cornutus’ 
Theologiae Graecae Compendium of the first century CE provides a key example of this 
kind of Stoic reading. Its method provides one of the key elements of theological-
                                                
19 Frag. 21 B 11, 12, 15, 16 D.  Freeman 1966: 88-104 provides a useful overview of 
Xenophanes’ life and philosophy, especially his animosity towards the poets. Kathryn A. Morgan, 
Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 47-62 explores Xenophanes’s skepticism towards the value of mythological discourse in 
general, and Homeric and Hesiodic portrayals of anthropomorphic gods in specific. Morgan 
addresses both Xenophanes’s philosophical disagreement with these poets and his disagreement 
over how poetry ought to portray deities in the first place. 
20 Plato, Protag. 338e6-339a3. Morgan 2000, 89-101 discusses the qualities of this competitive 
exegesis in greater detail. 
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cosmological allegory. Cornutus sought out the true derivations of the names and epithets 
of the gods to discover their original meanings, which explained the qualities of the 
cosmos. This method resembles allegory in its stitching together of hidden meanings to 
articulate a system, but it does not rest fundamentally on a narrative–even a short one, 
like the brief description that captures Porphyry’s attention in De antro nympharum, 
which Porphyry places in the context of the greater narrative of the Odyssey. 
 Cornutus did not approach the Homeric poems with the assumption that Homer 
wrote intentional allegories. For Cornutus and the Stoics, Homer’s verse encoded the 
wisdom of sages of even greater antiquity than Homer himself. Homer was not the only 
poet to slip great, ancient insight into his works; Hesiod and others composed similarly. 
Key to this conception of the ancient poets is that they were not by necessity aware of the 
value of the insights contained in their poems.21 Rather, they were generations closer to 
the unknown sages who had a far more comprehensive and authentic understanding of 
the cosmos than anyone after, either in Homer’s day or in the sophisticated world of the 
early Principate.  Sometimes the kernel of a cosmic truth was buried in the etymology of 
a divine name, and sometimes it was buried in a myth that would need to be interpreted 
allegorically to make complete sense of it. 
 Porphyry’s interpretation of Homer includes elements very much in accordance 
with Cornutus’s type of interpretation, but functions in the context of his Neoplatonic 
conception of the cosmos. Whereas for Cornutus, being a Stoic, the cosmos was 
                                                
21 Dawson 1992, 23-38 contains a detailed discussion of Cornutus’ methodology. Lucas 
Siorvanes, “Perceptions of the Timaeus: Thematization and Truth in the Exegetical Tradition,” in 
Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus, (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2003), 161-164. 
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ultimately material and the highest goal was to achieve happiness through ethical conduct 
and taming of the passions, for Porphyry the sensible world was not the ultimate reality, 
but it was a necessary and true consequence of the One.22 Homer’s conceptions of the 
gods could therefore be interpreted as symbolic representations of the intelligible reality 
perceptible through proper contemplation. In the Homeric Questions attributed to 
Porphyry, the philosopher cites two lines of the Odyssey describing Circe and these 
beasts with the minds of men and spins these lines into several pages of rational discourse 
heavily influenced by Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean ideas. Circe is, rather than a 
character the force of metempsychosis through which souls pass into and out of γένεσις, 
the world of becoming where souls and bodies come together. Porphyry supports this 
reading with other Homeric references. For instance, Circe is the daughter of Helios, the 
sun, who himself represents this cycle of death and rebirth.23 The hierarchy of Homeric 
gods thus comes to serve a complex Neoplatonic framework of intermediary powers that 
have particular bearings on the relationship between humans and the One. 
 This Porphyrian methodology was built out of a Stoic framework for which 
Cornutus was not the first, but certainly a key source. In his Contra Christianos, 
Porphyry lists key figures in the development of allegorical exegesis, and alongside the 
predictable set of Platonists an Pythagoreans–including Numenius and Cronius, whom he 
cites frequently in De antro nympharum–he adds only two Stoics, Cornutus and 
                                                
22 The relationship between Porphyry’s and Plotinus’ philosophy and Porphyry’s reading of 
Homer will be discussed in greater depth below. 
23 Keaney and Lamberton 1996, Lamberton 1979, 108-134. 
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Chaeremon.24 Cornutus was important for Porphyry not only for his contributions to 
allegorical methodology, but also for his views on the ancients as philosophers, another 
key question for Greek philosophers from an early point. This question was borne not out 
of Homer, but Hesiod, and specifically Hesiod’s account of the ages of humankind. 
Broadly speaking, this account posed a problem for the philosophers because the gods 
appeared spiteful towards humanity: why was it necessary for the happy, prosperous 
Golden Age to end? Why were humans recreated in poorer materials, and to greater 
toil?25 
 This matter has a twofold implication for reading Porphyry. First, the conception 
of an originally happy race of people who were once close to the gods but became full of 
vice over time–whether through external corruption or because of an inborn seed of 
wickedness–resonates with the Neoplatonic project of divine assimilation.26 By 
cultivating the intellect in contemplation, which began on a rational discursive level and 
ascended to a non-rational, non-discursive level, a philosopher could return to the original 
immaterial state of the soul before its descent into a body. Second, the Neoplatonists were 
concerned with maintaining a pure line of succession not only beginning with Plato, but 
also extending farther back into the distant reaches of antiquity to the ancient sages, like 
Homer and Hesiod and, even older, Orpheus. Individuals differed on the dynamics of 
                                                
24 G. R. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to 
Origen, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49-59. Porphyry, Contra Christianos, fr. 39, 30-
35 Harnack. 
25 Boys-Stones 2003, 3-27 summarizes the reception of Hesiod’s ages and the attitude of the 
ancients toward their ancestors’ wisdom and virtue (or absence of it). 
26 For a closer look at the ancient debate about the state of virtue and vice in the original class of 
people, see Boys-Stones 2003, 28-43. 
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these ancients’ wisdom, which could be rational philosophical wisdom or divinely-
inspired wisdom of hazier origin. In any case, the general Neoplatonic tendency was, in 
keeping with the general current of Greek philosophy, to privilege old knowledge as 
purer. For the Neoplatonists, though, this model of original purity became another 
manifestation of the descent from the One that Plotinus argued for.27 Just as the 
multiplicity of the cosmos originated in the purity of the One, the Intellect, and the Soul, 
the multiplicity of ideas and thinkers originated in a very ancient class of humans who 
lived in closer contact to the divine than present humans. This notion of progression from 
a class of wise ancients contributed to one of the key features of Neoplatonic thought, its 
heavy reliance on the commentary form.28 By weaving new philosophical innovations 
into exegesis on existing texts, the Neoplatonists could keep the decadence and 
corruption of later, more sophisticated ages at bay and maintain a close link to the purer 
expressions of truth from previous generations. 
 The greatest and most authoritative opponent of Homer was probably Plato, 
whose works are full of distrust for language and writing on a basic level, although they 
are also riddled with philosophical myths and didactic allegories. He was so unimpressed 
with the etymological arguments popular among the Sophists29 that he spent the whole of 
the Cratylus concocting absurd etymologies to prove that an innate or divinely-appointed 
origin for words was ridiculous and false, and so applying etymological arguments to 
                                                
27 Lucas Siorvanes, “Perceptions of the Timaeus: Thematization and Truth in the Exegetical 
Tradition,” in Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus, (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 
2003), 155-174. 
28 Siorvanes 2003, 164-166. 
29 For a discussion of the interpretative modes of the Sophists, see Morgan 2000, 89-131. 
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ancient poetry was clearly not a good use of time. Plato’s rejection of the poets comes 
into sharp focus at Republic 377d3-e4, when Socrates explains just what is so offensive 
about Homer, Hesiod, and their peers: “Οὗτοι γάρ που µύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς 
συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσιν,” which Socrates finds fault in just like he does “ὄταν 
εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἷοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς µηδὲν 
ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅµοια βουληθῇ γράψαι.”30 Poets present such bad likenesses of 
the gods and heroes that if not for the names attached, they would be unrecognizable. The 
very concept of gods striving against each other was inimical to Plato, and to present this 
trope over and over merely encouraged the guardian-class to strive against each other and 
make war in supposed imitation of the gods that rule the cosmos.31 The offenses of the 
poets on these counts are numerous, and Plato finds Homer a prime culprit. 
 Yet myth itself was not to be blamed–rather, the fault lay with poetical fancies. 
Plato used myth in a variety of ways, and his chief concern was that a myth needed to 
follow a rational λόγος if it was to be of any use, but did not need to be verifiable in an 
historical or investigative sense. It was deliberately symbolic and intended for symbolic 
interpretation. In Republic, Socrates argues that origin-myths (more precisely, τίς τῶν 
ψευδῶν, a highly distrustful metonym) that proclaim some sort of autochthony for the 
residents of a city are extremely useful for a city’s well-being.32 A suitable origin-myth 
                                                
30 Republic 377d3-e4. “For, it seems, these poets composing untrue stories both told and keep 
telling them to mortals.” “Whenever someone represents badly in his speech about the gods and 
heroes, whatever they are, just like a painter painting portraits of no resemblance to likenesses he 
wishes to paint.” 
31 Republic 378b6-e3. 
32 Republic 414b7-e7. Here Socrates gives the example of the “Noble Lie,” which emphasizes the 
didactic role of myth. 
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did not inspire people to hold false notions about justice or the gods, but merely anchored 
their sense of belonging in their city; it had an immediate pragmatic goal. While there 
were many types of myth in Plato’s writings, one key type for understanding De antro 
nympharum is the family of didactic myths, which often contained a moral or cosmic 
meaning. This form, which especially appealed to the Neoplatonists, became over time 
the myth as expresser of inexpressible meanings–perhaps even the ultimate meaning, the 
ineffable One of which all the cosmos is a consequence. This notion finds its root in 
Plato’s use of myth to bridge the gap where language failed but meaning persisted.33 The 
process of moving from concrete to abstract intelligible knowledge required an inventive 
use of language and reason, and symbolic narratives had the capacity to effect that ascent. 
 The reader of De antro nympharum cannot help but associate Porphyry’s 
treatment of Homer’s cave with perhaps the most famous cave in antiquity: Plato’s.34 The 
cave, along with the sun and the line, of Republic operates on a different level than 
Porphyry’s, but there are some important connections between the two. Plato’s cave is a 
model of human experience in the material world and its meaning pertains 
simultaneously to the individual soul and to the role of individual soul in a political 
community. The only way to achieve philosophical enlightenment is to leave the cave, 
and the enlightened have a responsibility to return to the cave and ensure that those still 
dwelling in it, if they are not fellow guardians, live well-ordered lives according to the 
guardians’ knowledge of the Good. Porphyry follows Plato in that he too argues that the 
                                                
33 Morgan 2000, 179-184. 
34 Republic 506d-518b. 
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enlightened have a role as teachers, but his ultimate concern is not particularly political, 
and as this paper will argue, Porphyry fashions a role for the teacher of philosophy 
analogous to that of the mystagogue, a guide to higher, unseen realms of contemplation. 
 Porphyry’s cave had two other features that distinguished it from Plato’s. First, 
the cave is not merely an argumentative construct or a symbolic narrative with a solely 
didactic purpose: it exists in the real world. The question of the cave’s location had been 
a longstanding issue for Homeric commentators, and some did believe it was a Homeric 
invention, but Porphyry disagreed and his argument became something like a 
methodological sketch in the first portion of De antro nympharum. This section of his 
argument will be useful to examine in some detail now. Porphyry outlined the angles that 
his predecessors had taken with this problem–for instance, Cronius declaring that the 
cave had to be a fictive invention because it was full of too many bizarre obscurities, like 
the ἱστοὶ λίθεοι περιµήκεες, the huge stone looms, with which the nymphs did their 
weavings (De ant. 3.19-20). These weavings themselves baffled Cronius since Homer 
describes them as sea-purple, ἁλιπόφυρα, when their color defines them as visible, but 
nymphs’ weavings should not be visible to the senses of embodied mortals. 
 Because of these inconsistencies and oddities, the cave must be an invention. 
Porphyry countered this line of argument by citing Artemidorus the Geographer to come 
up with a preliminary hypothesis that the cave was not entirely invented. He cited also the 
very ancient practice of establishing shrines in caves, which struck him as a major insight 
from the ancients because caves made for a good model of the cosmos. They were 
physical, composed of the earth itself, but they were also hollow and therefore 
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representative of the connection between the material and immaterial realms (De ant. 4-
5). Overall Porphyry disagreed with Cronius and anyone who thought similarly because 
cave-shrines had a long tradition in Greece and because of the numerous others, such as 
Artemidorus of Ephesus the geographer, who had located the cave. Porphyry determined 
that even if the Homeric cave represented an embellishment on the actual cave on Ithaca, 
there was certainly a real cave in the sensible world upon which this poetic cave 
depended.35 Homer’s cave as it appears in Porphyry’s essay is a poetic embellishment 
whose existence requires the existence of a physical cave, and the physical cave–as 
Porphyry points out–is a symbol of the cosmos and the ἐγκοσµίων δυνάµεων, the 
“encosmic powers” (De ant. 9.1-2). 
 These “encosmic powers” suggest the next area of departure from Plato’s cave to 
Porphyry’s. This term, “encosmic”, appears also in Porphyry’s commentary on the 
Timaeus and several times in Iamblichus’s De Mysteriis, always referring to the things 
that permeate the cosmos, such as the soul that according to the Neoplatonists (as in a 
similar way for the Stoics, to whom Porphyry also points) was all-present in the material 
world.36 Before Porphyry and Iamblichus, however, the term is extremely rare, with only 
a handful of other references in the fragments of Thales, Democritus, Pseudo-Archytas, 
Clinias, and the Septem Sapientes Apophthegmata, and in these uses the word is 
                                                
35 This relationship will come to resemble the relationship between the sensible and intelligible 
worlds as Plotinus defines them–the sensible world depending on the intelligible world, not 
representing a falsehood or a distraction but rather existing as a necessary consequence of the 
intelligible world. The relationship between Porphyry’s cave of the nymphs and Plotinus’ 
philosophy will be explored later on. 
36 De Mysteriis 3.28.31, 5.3.5, 5.20.2, 5.20.12. Porphyry In Platonis Timaeum commentaria book 
2 frag. 69.6. 
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consistently found in similar contexts to the later usages.37 From the fourth century 
onward, though, ἐγκοσµίος becomes a common word among Neoplatonist philosophers 
and theologians such as Proclus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Syrianus. Proclus found the term 
especially useful for describing the gods and other deathless powers that populate the 
Neoplatonic cosmos, and this takes on particular significance in Porphyry’s discussion of 
the dual gates of the nymphs’ cave (De ant. 20-31). While this word has a handful of 
occurrences in the philosophical tradition before Porphyry and Iamblichus and so 
therefore is probably not a neologism by someone in later circles, it seems apparent that 
the meaning had a new relevance for the Neoplatonists, who saw the One, the Intellect, 
and the Soul as all-pervading. 
 Porphyry is careful to note that Homer didn’t label these gates as belonging to 
humans on one side and the gods on the other. Rather humans, ανθρώποισι and ἄνδρες, 
descend through one northerly entrance, while the other southerly entrance is the path for 
immortals, ἀθανάτων ὁδός ἐστιν (Od. 13.110-112, De ant. 23.1-6). Porphyry interprets 
this to mean that souls, which are the immortal portion of a human, may pass through the 
immortal gate on their journey away from the material world and towards the divine 
realm. The gate for humans, or as Lamberton’s 1983 translation renders the word, 
mortals, he interprets as the gate where souls descend into γένεσις, At this point, it 
appears Porphyry’s mystical side gets the better of his rational side, and he appeals to the 
Zodiacal significance of dual gates in north and south, as well as the testimony of his 
                                                
37 Thales. Frag. 3, 7. Democritus Frag. 5, 65. Clinias 108.28. Septem Sapientes Apophthegmata 
Div. 5.18.8. 
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forebears Cronius and Numenius, to argue more forcefully for his own interpretation.38 
Porphyry equates the northern gate with the Tropic of Cancer and the southern gate with 
the Tropic of Capricorn, and as ancient attestation to the appropriateness of this 
relationship he cites the Roman Saturnalia, which occurs while the sun is in Capricorn. 
For this piece of insight, he credits the founder of the Saturnalia with the same kind of 
insight that Homer had; Porphyry seeks the meaning that αἰνιξαµένου τοῦ νοµοθέτου, 
that the founder was hinting at. (De ant. 23.6-24.9). This is the same verb that Porphyry 
began his interpretation with, in that case with regard to Homer. For Porphyry, the 
ancient festival of the Saturnalia contains a cosmic insight identical to the one Homer had 
when he described the gates of the nymphs’ cave. This relation of the cave’s gates to the 
Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn has a further significance beyond its Zodiacal or 
astrological meaning; it also roots the cave yet more firmly in the realm of physical 
experience with geographical terminology. 
 This dual meaning marks still another example of Porphyry’s insistence on the 
cave’s nature as both real and poetic. Despite its materiality, which Porphyry argues for 
in the introduction of the De antro nympharum, the cave stands for the very process of 
γένεσις, which has no one geographic location but instead occurs anywhere a soul comes 
into or leaves a body. In this respect, it resembles Plato’s cave, which is “located” 
wherever an individual attains knowledge of the Forms and then brings that knowledge 
back to those still dwelling in the cave. The soul ascends through the northerly gate and 
                                                
38 This distinction between mystical and rational is based in the ancient opposition of ritual and 
logical processes, which came into sharp focus with Plotinus’s refutation of the Gnostics. 
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rejoins the divine, and perhaps even the World Soul, which exists everywhere in the 
cosmos. In this regard, the cave itself is encosmic; it can represent all the features of the 
cosmos that pertain to the interactions between mortals and immortals. 
 These encosmic powers take on different forms in the various philosophers; for 
example, Iamblichus is much more detailed about the organization of these daimons and 
deities than Porphyry is, and this divine hierarchy comprises much of his De Mysteriis. 
Yet for Porphyry, too, the cosmos is full of immaterial connections to the divine. The 
cave on Ithaca is no exception: it is a home for Naiad nymphs, which Porphyry says are a 
conventional name for “the powers set over the waters” (De ant. 10.8-9). These nymphs 
are δυνάµεις, and they possess a specific realm of command over the waters, which 
Porphyry considers a way of referring to the power of γένεσις as mentioned below in his 
discussion of Circe in his Homeric questions. For Porphyry, Homer’s Naiads are an 
embedded piece of philosophical insight, and the lines of the Odyssey that evoke them 
have an effect on the philosophically-inclined reader beyond simply providing a 
mysterious, picturesque diversion. 
 In other words, Porphyry treats the cave of the nymphs as a model of the cosmos 
itself, a microcosm, and he embeds this link in the very ancient, well-attested practice of 
establishing shrines in caves. While Plato’s cave is itself a symbolic tool, it lacks the 
totality of Porphyry’s cave because Plato’s cave represents a model of human experience, 
whereas Porphyry’s represents a model of mortal souls coming into and out of bodies, of 
the relationship more broadly between the material and immaterial, and also a model for 
the individual pursuit of philosophical enlightenment through contemplation. Moreover, 
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Porphyry’s cave exists in the realm of the senses. It is a natural feature that manifests key 
qualities of the Neoplatonic cosmos. These key qualities, like the Naiad nymphs, provide 
a link between the material and immaterial worlds. The Naiads are also the mechanism of 
the soul’s rebirth into bodies; no comparable mechanism exists in Plato’s cave, which is 
restricted to exploring the limitations and possibilities of the soul within a body. 
Moreover, the linguistic echoes between Porphyry and Iamblichus in their joint concern 
with things encosmic hints at a greater level of interchange between the two than their 
antagonistic dialogues suggests. Exploration of this relationship will prove fruitful, and 
will bring the connections between Porphyry’s cave and Plato’s into better focus. 
 
The Mysteries and Philosophy 
 
 “The mysteries,” τὰ µυστήρια, were at their core a religious phenomenon, and of 
great antiquity.39 The ancients themselves referred to the sacred rites of Demeter and 
Persephone at Eleusis as mysteries, and there were many others throughout the Greek 
world, such as the rites of Samothrace.40 The mysteries were kept strictly secret and 
scholars can reconstruct very little of any particular mystery rite or cult because the 
ancients kept to their silence so well. Moreover, much of the apparent exegesis on the 
mysteries comes from later Christian authors who tended to have a less than favorable 
                                                
39 Heraclitus, frag. 14.4 cites the mysteries. 
40 The mysteries of Eleusis, although modern scholars have often sought esoteric meaning in 
them, were from an early point a major, integral component of the Athenian festal year, and this 
is reflected even in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter. 
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perspective on the older traditions, so it is best to use caution when reading these 
accounts for historical detail on individual rituals. For example, one key source on 
mystery rites is Clement of Alexandria, the late second century Christian allegorist who 
had a tendency to emphasize the goriest details of myth and ritual to degrade traditional 
Greco-Roman religious practices and myths. Clement made good use of the Phrygian 
rites for Cybele and Attis because of their bloody myth and ritual, and in case that was 
not startling enough he ties in his account of the castration of Ouranos, which he possibly 
thinks is Zeus’s doing.41 Clement connects all these rites because of their dubious 
thematic relationship–they are all sensational to him in the same way–and even though he 
cites the sacred objects of the Phrygian mysteries, his accuracy regarding both the 
identification of the objects and the connections between the myth and the ritual are 
unclear. 
 Although the mysteries differ from one another depending on place and time, and 
although there is a vast gulf between the Eleusinian rites celebrated by every Athenian 
and the Mithraic rites celebrated by men in small, seemingly voluntary groups across the 
Roman world, there are a few common themes among them that will come into sharper 
focus with a general typology of mystery rituals. One of the basic features of these rituals 
is the presence of “things done, things said, and things revealed,” δρώµενα, λεγόµενα, 
δεικνυµένα. These categories are broad, but some distinctions are possible. The δρώµενα 
could include elements of procession, as in the Eleusinian rites, which involved both a 
long procession to Eleusis itself and a more restricted entry into the closed-off space 
                                                
41 Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus 2.15.1-5. 
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where the rites apparently occurred. The λεγόµενα seem to have had a range of hymns 
and possibly vows offered to the god. The δεικνυµένα were on a material level sacred 
objects restricted from the view of non-initiates and shown to initiates as perhaps the 
culmination of the ritual. Here again, a disproportionate amount of testimony comes from 
Clement of Alexandria, but in the case of the Eleusinian rites these objects seem to have 
been along the lines of an ear of wheat, a phallus, and perhaps a few other objects.42 Non-
initiates became initiates through the proper observance of these rituals, led by a 
mystagogue, and at least in the case of the Eleusinian rites there were two levels of 
initiation: the µυστής was the initiate of the first, “Lesser” mysteries, and the ἐποπτής the 
initiate of the second, “Greater” mysteries. The mystagogue was essential to the proper 
performance of the ritual; without guidance, an initiate could not hope to achieve a divine 
revelation. In this regard the mystagogue resembles the teacher of philosophy, who has 
some claim to authentic knowledge–for instance, through succession in the case of the 
Platonic Academy–and who reveals this knowledge to students of philosophy through a 
progression of education and reasoning. After Plotinus, this progression made a leap to a 
more esoteric level as the abandonment of discursive reasoning became essential for 
philosophical enlightenment. 
 For a long time scholars have sought some sort of Christian teleology in these 
rites: the standard line has been that they offer salvation in the afterlife, of one sort or 
another. This may have become the case later in antiquity, but for the most part it seems 
                                                
42 Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus. 
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untrue.43 Even language that seems terribly obvious–for instance, calling Isis savior, 
σωτηρ–does not often hold up to examination. The epithet “savior” seems to apply 
especially to deities who have proven themselves efficacious against disease. The salvific 
promise is not for a life after, but for the present life. These scholars have looked for 
something like a conversion experience in the mysteries, whereby an initiate experiences 
a change in total worldview as a result of a ritual. The world is never the same after this 
experience because the initiate has accepted a new set of guiding moral principles and 
abandoned the old ones. Early scholars of mystery religions applied this theory to the 
practices they studied, regardless of scanty evidence for the psychology of a mystery 
initiate. As early as the 1930s, though, Nock criticized this tendency and posited a 
different point of origin for the conversion experience: philosophy. According to Nock, 
Greek philosophical schools such as Epicureanism offered precisely this experience of 
casting off old moral precepts and taking up new ones, even principles radically at odds 
with the traditional religious-moral complex.44 Only much later did Greco-Roman 
mystery cults potentially absorb this conversion experience, and this was in the context of 
the eclectic late antique world where theurgy, astrology, and religious practice came 
together in various ways, sometimes in a seemingly self-conscious revival of the old 
ways. 
 Some of the confusion surrounding the conversion experience in the mysteries 
and in philosophy lies in the terminology involved in discussions of these cults. The 
                                                
43 Arthur Darby Nock, Conversion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), PP. Franz 
Cumont, The Mysteries of Mithra (New York: Cosimo, 2007). 
44 Nock 1933. 
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terms “mystic” or “mystical” can have very foggy meanings. While these terms can 
retroject anachronistic notions of metaphysical revelation into older ritual practices, like 
the Eleusinian rites in the Classical period, by Porphyry’s day the more theoretically-
laden, esoteric set of meanings is appropriate.45 It took some centuries for (philosophical) 
conversion to a new moral or cosmic paradigm to become a part of the religious 
mysteries, but as in the Heraclitus fragment noted above, philosophy from an earlier point 
had been described as having its own mysteries. These mysteries were, like the 
Eleusinian mysteries, ineffable, but not in the same way. Initiates of mystery cults were 
forbidden to speak of the rites under threat of divine vengeance, and the utter silence of 
the sources–even those authors who expressed great interest in the cults, like Pausanias–
on the details of the rituals is a testament to how seriously the Greeks took this 
stipulation. In the case of philosophy, however, the ineffability of the mysteries seems, 
especially over time, to be less about secrecy and more about the impossibility of 
expressing cosmic truths in narrative discourse either because of the indeterminacy and 
changeability of language, or because the nature of the cosmos was simply too much 
grander than language could ever describe. As has been discussed, these two notions had 
gained significant traction by Plato’s day, and the latter especially would become central 
to Neoplatonic doctrine. 
                                                
45 Giulia Sfameni-Gasparro, “Mysteries and Oriental Cults: A Problem in the History of 
Religions,” in The Religious History of the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews, and Christians, ed. J. 
A. North and S. R. F. Price (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 276-312. Sfameni-Gasparro 
draws a series of distinctions in the conception of the mysteries, generally following a trajectory 
of less- to more-esoteric as time went on.  
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 It is important to note that Porphyry does not rely much on these terms in his 
discussion of the nymphs’ cave. He discusses the cave in terms of ritual and he does 
involve the Persian mystagogues in his examination of caves as cosmic symbols, but this 
particular terminology is not necessary for his argument. He uses µυστικῶς once 
adverbially and συµβόλων µυστικῶν once adjectivally in De antro nympharum (4.4, 
4.21). The adverbial form describes Cronius’s conception of Homer’s placement of the 
olive tree near the cave; Lamberton (1983) translates this as “for some mysterious 
reason,” and this translation catches some of the sense of Cronius’s indecision or lack of 
precision in his exegesis, according to Porphyry. The usage is probably not incidental, 
though, because a few lines later Porphyry refers to the ancients’ founding of cave-
shrines which wouldn’t be done ἄνευ συµβόλων µυστικῶν, without mystic symbols. 
Lamberton again translates µυστικῶν as “mysterious,” but given the word’s occurrence in 
a cultic scenario, the original ritual meanings are clearly present. The more esoteric 
meanings seem to be present, too, since for one thing Porphyry was no stranger to 
esoteric philosophy and for another the word occurs in the context of determining the true 
relationship between the real-world cave and the poetic cave. 
 Along these lines, Porphyry’s use of terms related to µύστης and µυσταγωγέω is 
relatively limited and specific. He uses the word µύστης, initiate to the mysteries, twice 
in the De antro nympharum: first when he discusses the Persian mystagogues in the 
beginning (De antro, 6.9) and then when he explains the role of the bees in Homer’s 
description of the stone amphorae (De antro, 15.12). Once again, Porphyry sets the poet’s 
imagery into the context of Mithraic ritual, which had become extremely prevalent in the 
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Mediterranean after the start of the first century. The relationship between the bees and 
amphorae to the Mithraic  ritual, as well as to Porphyry’s theology, is based on 
similarities between objects and their meanings. The amphorae are similar to a ritual 
bowl used by initiates to the Mithraic mysteries, which symbolizes fountains and the 
generative power of the nymphs, whom Porphyry considers a symbolic version of the 
soul, whose coming into being is characterized by an increase in wetness. The word 
µύστης in this section literally refers to the Mithraic initiates, in particular the ones who 
use fire for ritual purification. Porphyry’s exegesis on Homer is thoroughly intertwined 
with his explanation of the Mithraic rites; by describing one, it seems, he describes the 
other. 
 One of the key aspects of Homer’s cave, for Porphyry, is that it is full of natural 
features that mimic the products of civilization. It is as if the cave of the nymphs is a 
natural location that contains an essence of the divine, the way that Iamblichus’ onomata 
barbara “hang” from the divine beings.46 This question of the cave’s material-spiritual 
nature leads Porphyry back to his initial question: is the cave real, or is it Homer’s 
invention? While Porphyry thinks he has found the correct cave in the real world, as he 
discussed early on, he still considers any given cave εἰκόνα καὶ σύµβολον, image and 
symbol, of the κόσµος (De antro, 21.4). Κόσµος for Porphyry is the appropriate term for 
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the whole world, the universe, which includes both the material world that humans 
inhabit and perceive, as well as the divine realms which can only be represented 
metaphorically and, according to Porphyry, contemplated meditatively. A real-world cave 
that has the features Homer describes would still provide the basis for the theological 
contemplation that Porphyry argues is the key to the divine.47 In locating the cave of the 
nymphs geographically, Porphyry discusses the theologians–θεολόγοι,48 distinct from the 
philosophers and from the ancients, another class of those particularly well-connected 
with the divine–who consider the two entrances to the caves linked metaphorically to the 
tropics of Cancer and Capricorn, and therefore heavenly as well as earthly (De antro, 
29.12).49 In the interpretative tradition of the nymphs’ cave, this duality is longstanding; 
the twofold gate is itself (De antro, 29.11-15). Porphyry says even Plato considered a 
double gate to be a pathway to heaven, εἰς οὐρανόν (De antro, 29.11). 
 Porphyry in this way modifies Plato’s cave model to construct a model for a 
conversion experience, a re-ordering of the cosmos in accordance to a new set of 
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principles that demand a particular set of morals from the adherent.50 For Plato, the actual 
experience of this conversion or enlightenment–the psychological or spiritual details–is 
either irrelevant or inarticulable, and he prefers to describe by way of allegory. Porphyry 
in a sense borrows Plato’s cave when he writes on the nymphs’ cave in Homer. No 
philosophically-inclined reader would have been able to read his essay without having 
Plato’s allegory in mind, especially given Porphyry’s reference to Plato’s interpretation 
of a double gate, and in this light the De antro leads the reader simultaneously through 
the katabasis of the Orphics, down into the literary cave, and the ascent of the Platonists, 
upward towards the transcendent meaning encoded in Homer’s text. In the conception of 
the later Platonists, Plato, after all, is one of those philosophers especially gifted with 
divine wisdom, just like one of the ancients. On the other hand, Homer, after the Stoic 
tradition, possesses by his very antiquity a greater level of insight to the divine, and for 
Porphyry it is prudent to understand Homer’s sometimes elliptical wisdom by way of 
Plato’s often more straightforward framework. The contemplative person cannot reach 
transcendence simply through reading either Homer or Plato, but by steadily working 
through the complexities that each presents–at times apparently in conflict, but to the 
contemplative these conflicts will resolve themselves in an experience of the divine 
intellect. 
 Porphyry was not himself a theurgist, but theurgy attracted him at points in his 
life and an esoteric-mystic thread runs through his philosophy. In the vein of Plotinus, 
Porphyry believed that through contemplation, it was possible for mortals to achieve 
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assimilation to the divine. This contemplation took many stages and great patience, and 
while it began with rational discourse in the form of studies like astronomy and 
mathematics, an aspiring philosopher eventually needed to abandon the tools that 
discourse provided to attain pure thought itself–a wordless, inexpressible state that stood 
closer to the One.51 The way that Porphyry (by way of Plotinus) conceived of these 
philosophical tools bringing students of philosophy closer and closer to the One marks a 
key formal similarity between philosophical contemplation and religious ritual in 
Porphyry’s contemporary, Iamblichus. The tension between these two philosophers is not 
the construct of modern scholars; they left behind evidence enough in Porphyry’s Letter 
to Anebo, in which he denounced theurgy and mystery ritual practice. Most scholars 
today believe that Anebo was a not-so-veiled Egyptian pseudonym for Iamblichus, which 
falls in line with the general sentiment in antiquity that the rituals of theurgy came from 
the east and especially from Egypt.52 Iamblichus did not let this denunciation pass 
without comment and responded in turn with his De mysteriis.53 The two philosophers 
did rely on similar backgrounds; for instance, Porphyry’s fundamental notion of genesis, 
the process of souls condensing into bodies, is rooted not only in Plato’s philosophy of 
soul, but also in Pythagorean ideas about metempsychosis and the return of souls. 
Iamblichus was the author of a treatise that survives in fragmentary form De vita 
pythagorica and Porphyry was the author of a Vita Pythagorae. However, whereas 
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Iamblichus found a mystic trigger in theurgical rituals and incantations that resisted 
discursive interpretation, Porphyry sought discursive meaning in the tools he used for 
philosophical contemplation. 
 For both Porphyry and Iamblichus, students of one of the great teachers in the 
history of philosophy, the system of contemplation–or divine invocation, in the case of 
Iamblichus–was not an intuitive system. There had to be a teacher and there had to be 
precepts of some sort. For Iamblichean theurgy, the teacher took on a role at times 
indistinguishable from the mystagogue, the priest who led neophytes through mystery 
rituals for the purpose of an initiation. Porphyry belonged to a long tradition that could 
trace its origins back to Plato himself, but as unspeakable divine assimilation became part 
of the Platonic tradition with Plotinus, the role of the teacher changed. While 
Neoplatonists from Plotinus onward continued the progression of studies with the 
purpose of attaining higher contemplations, those higher contemplations that fell beyond 
the capabilities of discourse and reason required special types of preparation.54 Allegory, 
which brought the reader to a new level of real meaning beyond the apparent level, itself 
provided an excellent model for the relationship between the sensible world and the 
intelligible world. 
 Although Porphyry must have been well acquainted with the tradition of Homeric 
interpretation, the only thinkers he cited in any depth are Cronius and Numenius, two 
Platonists of one or two generations before his own.55 He referenced others when 
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pertinent; for instance, Artemidorus of Ephesus had theorized about the location of the 
cave, so Porphyry quoted Artemidorus during the course of that discussion.56 When 
Porphyry explained the relationship of the Naiad nymphs to the cycle of genesis, he 
quoted Heraclitus’ line, “A dry soul is wisest.”57 While some modern commentators have 
called Porphyry an unoriginal thinker whose ideas mostly belonged to others, De antro 
nympharum is not a simple amalgam of his predecessors’ Homeric interpretations.58 In 
fact, Porphyry typically did not agree with previous interpretations on this passage. 
Moreover, he seemed not to view a rigorous knowledge of older commentary as crucial 
for correct interpretation, although knowledge of philosophy is. The passage stands 
nearly on its own in his essay in terms of the history of its scholarship, and rather than 
build up a scaffold of the history of commentary around the passage, Porphyry saw in it 
many threads of philosophy woven through. To understand the passage appropriately, a 
reader had to be able to see these threads, and once they were revealed the text could take 
on a greater purpose. 
 In the tradition of Cornutus, Porphyry saw Homer’s verse as containing keen 
insights about the metaphysical composition of the world encoded into narrative poems. 
These complex poems took on two essential roles for Porphyry: on the one hand, he uses 
Homer’s verse to elucidate and inform philosophy, and on the other, he uses these 
philosophical progenitors like Cronius and Numenius to elucidate and inform Homer. 
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Each of these aspects of his discussion feeds into his greater argument about the nature of 
the soul and the cosmos. Multiple levels of teaching occur in the De antro nympharum. 
Homer taught both Porphyry and any other reader divine truths, but Homer’s divine 
truths were easily misunderstood, even by a skilled reader. By reading Porphyry’s 
interpretations, a student of philosophy could bypass wrong interpretations and come to a 
deeper understanding of both Homer and the cosmos. Porphyry therefore functions as the 
teacher through the mediation of his essay. Once a student has reached the level of truth 
that Porphyry has laid open with this essay–and his others on Homeric questions–still 
further contemplations remain unexplored. Some of these contemplations might have 
been rational and discursive, but others might have been beyond that point, unreachable 
through allegorical reading, but perhaps requiring the understanding that allegorical 
reading provided in order to be discovered.59 
 The relationship between poetry and the divine was by no means a new notion to 
the Greeks of Porphyry’s day, or even Plato’s. The Homeric Hymns, which date starting 
from the mid-sixth century BCE, indicate that from an early point in Greek history 
poetically-minded praise and narrative were an effective way to invoke a god. Plato 
himself composed the Cratylus in critique of the notion that the names of things were 
divinely-ordained, and that the truth of this matter was attainable through etymological 
arguments similar to Cornutus’s. By the time Porphyry and Iamblichus were writing, the 
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mechanisms behind this incantation-invocation phenomenon were fairly well-
schematized. While Porphyry and others attacked theurgy and magic alike as hubristic  
For Iamblichus and the Syrian Neoplatonists of his school, theurgical invocation was 
separate from magical coercion. Instead, he treats the practices of theurgy as containing a 
form of similarity to the gods and divine powers, who exist in a complex hierarchy 
leading from the individual human up to the divine One.60 His theurgical pantheon rests 
on a Plotinian foundation, but it embellishes Plotinus’ hierarchy to fit identifiable gods 
and powers in a somewhat more concrete way than Plotinus’ or Porphyry’s method. The 
divine similarity of theurgic practices appeals to these powers, who turn toward the 
theurgist in emanation as the theurgist’s soul ascends to meet the divine. Varied types of 
actions contain this similarity: nonsense phrases like the onomata barbara, intelligible 
prayers, statues, fumigations, and other practices familiar from religious ritual all have 
power to invoke particular divine powers. 
 Porphyry rejected these practices as ineffective, but not only on accusations of 
superstition or charlatanism. Theurgy was a non-discursive practice at its core and its 
rites resist the application of logical interpretative frameworks. Theurgy bore typological 
similarities to Porphyry’s Neoplatonic contemplation, according to Porphyry it did not 
rest on a logical framework. By providing philosophical tools like Homeric 
interpretation, Porphyry admitted that divine revelation could not take place in an 
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intellectual and sensory vacuum. Approaching the divine through the mediating lens of 
Homeric poetry allowed Porphyry to construct a complicated and vetted theology while 
leaving some leeway for individual interpretations. Iamblichean mysteries and theurgy 
with its repetitive ritual practice offered a similar concrete framework with room for 
individual practitioners to adjust rituals, but while the goal was the same–a revelatory 
experience of the mysteries of reality–the path was very different. 
 
 Language and Transcendence 
 
 Although Porphyry and Iamblichus took essentially different views on the proper 
way to approach the divine, these differences of mode can often inform one another. One 
key point of contact between Porphyry and Iamblichus is their reliance on language 
specifically to promote a connection to the divine. Each has a distinct use of language, 
but the two are more closely related than they first appear. The role of onomata barbara 
was key in Iamblichus’ theurgy. These phrases were very similar to the voces magicae of 
magical practice, which were words or phrases of dubious meaning and etymology that 
seem to have held some coercive power over gods or spirits. While scholars have 
connected some of these phrases to an intelligible meaning, like the formula ista pista 
sista to ista pestem sistat, “stop that pestilence”,61 most of them are very far removed 
from sense both for us and for the ancients. Commonly the creators of such phrases 
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would repeat a word with one letter removed until only a single letter remained, or create 
a corrupted palindrome of a line of Homer.62 Pliny the Elder in his Natural History wrote 
that these phrases must have held immense power over the gods, and this immense power 
was connected to their meaninglessness for humans. These words were intended for 
divine ears, and perhaps were even secret names for divine powers, like Iamblichus’ 
onomata barbara.63 The voces magicae were very widespread in antiquity, and the 
earliest reference to them comes from Cato the Censor’s De agricultura in an instance of 
what is traditionally considered “sympathetic” magic, and what Versnel calls magic 
functioning by analogy.64 
 Porphyry explicitly denounced Iamblichus’ onomata barbara and all his other 
rituals as mere magic in the Letter to Anebo. He had no patience for “meaningless” 
(ἄσηµα) words and he did not care for the use of foreign (βάρβαρα) words or names for 
gods over Greek ones.65 Porphyry, as far as he believed pure contemplation was the key 
to the divine, needed a meaningful system to organize this mental contemplation. Greek 
words and Greek names were naturally superior to variously meaningful ones, which may 
have been foreign and which may have signified different things to different people. 
After all, the gods themselves did not adhere to such boundaries as Greek versus 
Egyptian, so people would do best to refer to them at least in their own language to avoid 
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pretense and achieve a purer connection.66 For Iamblichus, though, there was a mystery 
in the meanings of these words that lay deeper than, for instance, Plato’s argument of 
nature versus convention in the Cratylus, a key dialogue for the Neoplatonists. These 
names have a “symbolic stamp” of their closeness to the gods, which makes them 
especially effective.67 This is again the mechanism of likeness that pervades Iamblichus’ 
thought. Peter Struck notes that Iamblichus refers to particular talismans or amulets that 
promote invocation of the gods by their proximity to the practitioner, but that he 
dismisses their efficacy.68 There is something unique about ritual words and names in 
Iamblichus’ reckoning, as there is something unique about Homeric poetry for Porphyry: 
each of these contains some similarity to the gods much greater and much more powerful 
than ordinary speech. In the respect that Porphyry views poetic language as having a 
special power over human experience, an inductive power leading to divine 
transcendence, his beliefs regarding the value of Homer are not so dissimilar from 
Iamblichus’ beliefs on the value of secret divine names. In each case, the correct 
approach sparks a mystic, ineffable divine experience that bears significant similarity to 
the mystery and mystic-esoteric religions of the Greek world leading up to and through 
this period. 
 The Orphic tradition was another longstanding Greek tradition that offered a 
privileged place to the text, especially in the form of hymns to the gods and of narrative 
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cosmogonies and theogonies. The Orphic cosmogonies offered a different explanation for 
origins than the traditional Homeric or Hesiodic narratives, and they have long been 
interpreted as an outsider religion more like a forerunner of Christianity than anything in 
its contemporary Greek context.69 While much of the Orphic tradition remains mysterious 
despite some tantalizing early evidence, like the fourth- or third-century BCE Orphic 
hymns, some certainties reveal themselves. There was no self-defined group of “Orphics” 
wandering the Classical world, but there were people who passed down Orphic 
knowledge from generation to generation, not unlike the way that ancient medical doctors 
passed knowledge on. Like the doctors, these practitioners of Orphic ritual employed 
their knowledge frequently for healing purposes, and if a particular ritual was effective 
for an individual, that ritual would become a standard for that person; if it was 
ineffective, the practitioner might modify or abandon it in favor of rituals that did work. 
One of the key components of Orphic ritual was the recitation of the cosmogony and 
theogony for a healing purpose. The mechanism behind this seems to have been a 
sympathetic–or analogic, after Versnel’s preferred framework–establishment of order, so 
that if the sick or otherwise afflicted person heard over and over again the appropriate 
order of the cosmos, their body would comply with that proper order and cease to be ill.70 
For the Orphics, then, as for the later theurgists, words had an efficacy to them. This 
efficacy is, at least originally, much more closely linked with the material world than it 
would be for Iamblichus or Porphyry. However, the function of poetic speech to cause a 
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re-ordering effect on the body provides an analogy for Porphyry’s use of Homeric poetry 
to re-order the soul, and orient it towards the divine. 
 In the Roman period leading up to and contemporary with Porphyry’s writing, 
Orphic literature and practice is much better attested. By this time, Orphic literature was 
routinely interpreted in either an exegetical manner, remaining close to the mythic 
narratives, or in an allegorical manner that diverged from the myth. The followers of 
Orphic wisdom, then, were very used to the kinds of allegorical reading that Porphyry 
employs in his treatment of Homer, and these methods were an important component of 
their understanding of the divine. At this later point in the Orphic tradition, there was a 
strong intellectual and esoteric thread to the hymns, theogonies, and rituals, and in this 
regard these poetic texts and their interpretations belonged to the ferment that produced 
Porphyry’s philosophy, too.71 Like the adherents of the  better-understood mysteries like 
those of Eleusis and Samothrace, the followers of Orpheus seem also to have taken some 
sort of oath of secrecy. This oath would have protected the forms of rituals and perhaps 
also the symbolic meanings of hymns and rituals alike from outsiders. Ancient 
commentators pointed to particular lines of hymns as referencing a god or gods as 
witnesses, depending on their ideology; a Neo-Pythagorean commentator saw reference 
to the Ogdoad, the eight deities ranking just below the One or Intellect, whereas a 
Christian apologist saw reference to the Christian Trinity.72 This late Orphic tradition 
provides evidence for a marrying of practices associated with mystery cults and the 
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intellectual tradition of philosophical, allegorical readings of texts and rituals. 
Iamblichus’ writings provide the most direct and clearest application of this ritual-
intellectual ferment to the Platonic tradition, but he was not alone in his project. 
 
Porphyry’s Cave and Philosophy in Later Antiquity 
 
 This study has so far touched on some of the essential features of the Neoplatonic 
cosmos particularly with relation to Iamblichean theurgy, but Porphyry’s philosophical 
method, including the use of Homeric interpretation found in De antro nympharum, owes 
just as much to Plotinus’ teachings. In her 2000 study of Neoplatonic discursivity, Sara 
Rappe writes, “[Plotinus] wants to lead the mind out of its habit of looking at the world as 
essentially outside of the self, as composed of a number of objects with discrete essences 
that are known in all sorts of ways, but primarily through the senses and through thinking 
about essences.”73 Plotinus’ cosmos intimately relates the sensible and intelligible realms, 
but it also intimately relates the elements of these realms with each other. He finds unity 
in the connection of individual souls to the World Soul, and this unity through likeness to 
the World Soul also means that individual souls are essentially like each other–even that 
bodies are like each other. Porphyry’s cave-as-microcosm again finds particular 
relevance. The material cave, if one were to seek it out, contains a series of features that 
are highly suggestive of the true nature of the cosmos, but it is not necessary to behold 
the cave with the senses in order to understand its meaning. The poetic version of the 
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cave is sufficiently present–sufficiently real. As a reader follows along with first Homer’s 
passage, and then Porphyry’s explanation of it, the cave comes to be in the reader’s mind; 
the words do not just evoke poetically, but also invoke the nymphs’ cave. On a most 
basic level, this invocation brings together a mysterious cave on Ithaca and a 
philosophically-inclined reader so that the reader is present in the cave, a location in the 
material world, but in an immaterial manner. 
 The use of reading found in Porphyry’s De antro nympharum has two key 
precedents than Plotinus’s writings, and these influenced Plotinus’s ideas as well. First, 
the Pythagoreans seem to have restricted their wisdom to an inner circle by means of 
enigmatic dicta, the ἄκουσµατα intended to make little sense to outsiders, but which 
acted almost as shorthand or mnemonics for those who had been schooled in the 
Pythagorean worldview according to Iamblichus.74 This was not quite the textual 
exegesis so important to Stoic commentators on ancient poetry, or to the later 
Neoplatonists, but it provided a very ancient and directly philosophical model for verbal 
maxims that held higher encoded meanings. Second, the Stoic meditatio and confessio 
had an important influence on Neoplatonic modes of reading. The meditatio and 
confessio were reading exercises designed to disengage the reader from unproductive 
distractions and subjective experience, and instead promote the viewpoint of a 
“spectator” possessing uncompromised calm and attention. Seneca’s Moral Epistles, 
Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations, and Augustine of Hippo’s Confessions all provide key 
examples of the genre. Unlike the Pythagorean ἄκουσµατα, these Stoic genres aimed less 
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at the revelation of cosmic knowledge and more at the taming of the soul with the 
ultimate goal of cosmic enlightenment. However, the soul had to be appropriately 
prepared for this kind of cosmic enlightenment, and the meditatio and related genres 
aided in this goal. 
 In recent decades, some effort has been made towards the recovery of Porphyry’s 
weightier ideas, especially his metaphysics, which are not as evident in the works that 
survive. At the same time, as noted earlier, scholars have spent a certain degree of energy 
on the chronology of his works.75 Despite their efforts, Porphyry’s metaphysics and a 
chronology of his works remain elusive. Some posit that he composed the exegetical and 
philological works during his early study with Longinus in Athens, but this hypothesis 
rests only on the knowledge that Porphyry learned philology with Longinus. The 
temptation to set these works during this time is perhaps understandable, but there is no 
reason to assume that Porphyry stopped doing philology when he came into contact with 
Porphyry. Minutely philological methods, like the previously-discussed Stoic etymology, 
were central to the writing of commentaries in general. As mentioned earlier, 
commentaries were a very popular philosophical genre in late antiquity, and there is some 
reason to set Porphyry at the beginning of this tradition.76 It is entirely plausible that 
Porphyry’s interest in exegesis and textual interpretation continued throughout his 
lifetime, and in fact the De antro nympharum includes elements that hint at a 
metaphysical system influenced by Plotinus. 
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 Plotinus’s absence from explicit mention from the text does not necessarily 
indicate his absence from Porphyry’s thought process, either, since contrary to his usual 
tendency towards extensive citation, in the De antro nympharum in general, Porphyry 
only cites other thinkers sporadically where he requires some clarification or some other 
viewpoint to oppose with his own. Cronius and Numenius appear several times, 
therefore, and Artemidorus the Geographer appears once, but otherwise Porphyry cites 
only Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, Plato, and “the theologians”, οἱ θεολόγοι, whose role has 
been discussed above. The ancient poets appear in what might be considered a somewhat 
more philological capacity; for instance, when Porphyry is uncovering the meaning of the 
amphoras of the cave that are filled with honey. After making a connection to Mithraic 
cult he draws a connection between honey with its physical properties of cleansing and 
preservation–of both food and dead bodies–to the nectar that the gods consume.77 Here he 
invokes the ancient authority of Homer’s description for nectar, νέκταρ ἐρυθρόν, because 
ἐρυθρόν is the color of honey.78 Moreover, Orpheus’s authority can verify this 
connection between honey and divine nectar, because in an Orphic fragment that 
Porphyry quotes, Zeus gets the opportunity to castrate Kronos when Kronos is in a 
drunken stupor after consuming honey, ἔργοισιν µεθύοντα µελισσάων ἐριβοµβέων, 
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“drunk with the works of buzzing bees” (De ant. 15.4-16.23).79 In short, Porphyry is 
concerned much more with the ways that the ancients used words in constructing his 
Homeric interpretation, and less with the ways that either other commentators have 
interpreted them or that other philosophers have used the concepts, and there is no reason 
to date De antro nympharum based on Plotinus’s lack of presence or on the dates of 
Porphyry’s study in Athens. 
 The allegory practiced in De antro nympharum at many points indicates a 
Neoplatonic–and therefore at least somewhat Plotinian–perspective.80 There are 
numerous elements of De antro nympharum that have ritual connections, but as this paper 
has argued, many of these elements are pulling the contents of mystery rituals into a 
symbolic framework that the ancient poets, and in particular Homer, established with 
their verses full of secret wisdom. Moreover, Plotinian practices of reading drew on older 
Stoic practices of reading that emphasized the ways that reading could detach the 
subjective self and allow purer contemplation of the divine. This act of reading was itself 
analogous to a ritual practice both in its repetitive nature and in its reliance on words, 
especially versified words. De antro nympharum is a Neoplatonic teaching text, one that 
manipulates the world of ritual and incantation to create a style of reading that fosters 
contemplation of and assimilation with the divine in the tradition of Plotinus. 
 
Conclusions 
                                                
79 Orph. frag. 154, Kern. 
80 Longinus, partly for what is known about his methods and partly for his stewardship of the 
Academy in Athens, is generally considered a tail-end Middle Platonist. 
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 This paper has examined the role of Porphyry’s De antro nympharum in the 
greater context of Homeric commentary and interpretation, as well as in connection to 
Neoplatonism’s attitudes towards ritual, magic, and theurgy. Porphyry figures himself as 
a figure analogous to the mystagogue, who leads his readers as philosophical initiates to 
the true meaning of Homer, himself a sort of mystagogue. He draws in a variety of 
mystery ritual practices alongside the insights of ancient poets and other philosophers, 
including Plato, in his interpretation of Homer. The result is a text that offers to the 
student of philosophy a guide for the appropriate way to approach divine contemplation, 
and even a place–a metaphysical, poetic place where souls pass into and out of bodies–in 
which to perform that contemplation. This use of the text as contemplative aid finds a 
very early precedent in the Orphic recitations of cosmogonies to re-order a diseased body 
as well as in the Pythagorean use of semi-public sayings with secret meanings attached 
which were only available to the members of the group. It also has more recent roots in 
the Stoic meditatio. Some modern scholars have considered Porphyry to be a second-rate 
thinker. However, the ferment of literary genres and ritual practices that the De antro 
nympharum puts to use in a Neoplatonic philosophical context belies that assumption. 
The De antro nympharum, though perhaps rather opaque at first, exemplifies the eclectic 
world of late antique thought, where even the exegesis had its own encoded meanings.
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